

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

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O 241520Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5367

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 485

NODIS

PASS ALSO TO WHITE HOUSE FOR SCOWCROFT

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, PFOR, YO, UR, AO

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY MINIC

1. LAST NIGHT JANUARY 23 I HAD TWO HOUR MEETING WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY MINIC. PASSED BOTH MESSAGES (REFTELS). I INDICATED THAT THE DECISION ON TWO REFLECTED THE PRESIDENT'S AND THE SECRETARY'S COMMITMENT EXPRESSED HERE IN BELGRADE AND BY THE SECRETJOY IN WASHINGTON IN SEPTEMBER TO PERSONALLY REVIEW MILITARY SALES QUESTIONS.

2. MINIC RESPONDED THAT THE TOW DECISION WAS VERY GOOD NEWS INDEED AND HE PARTICULARLY EXPRESSED HIS GENUINE AND WARM THANKS TO THE SECRETARY. HE ALSO SAID THAT GOY HAD BEEN CONFIDENT THAT WHEN PRESIDENT FORD SAID HE WOULD PERSONALLY LOOK INTO THE MATTER OF MILITARY SALES IN BELGRADE THAT HE WAS THE KIND OF MAN WHO WOULD FOLLOW THROUGH. HE NOTED THE SECRETARY HAD PROMISED A DECISION IN TWO WEEKS IN SEPTEMBER BUT HE UNDERSTOOD HOW DIFFICULT A QUESTION THIS WAS. I EMPHASIZED IN PARTICULAR THE SERIOUSNESS OF TAKING FOUR LAUNCHERS OUT OF EXISTING U.S. ARMY ASSETS AND MINIC INDICATED HE UNDERSTOOD THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUCH AN ACTION.

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3. HAVING ALREADY HEARD PRIOR TO MEETING WITH MINIC THAT GOY

WAS UPSET AT THE TENOR OF NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS ON THE TOW  
DECISION, I INITIATED DISCUSSION ON THAT ISSUE BY SAYING  
WE UNDERSTOOD THEIR CONCERN ABOUT IDENTIFYING  
THE SOVIETS AS A LIKELY ENEMY AND USG WOULD NOT DO  
THAT BUT THAT WE, OF COURSE, WERE PREPARED TO SELL  
TWO MISSILES TO YUGOSLAVS BECAUSE IT WAS IN  
OUR INTEREST TO DO SO AND THERE WAS NO WAY OF  
PREVENTING NEWSPAPERMEN FROM SPECULATING AS TO  
WHY IT WAS IN OUR INTEREST. MINIC HAD BEEN PREPARED  
TO LAUNCH INTO A DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT AND  
PROMPTLY DID SO. HE INDICATED THERE HAD BEEN ONE  
THEORY IN THE FOREIGN SECRETARIAT (STARCEVIC) THAT  
THE NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS WERE DESIGNED TO TORPEDO  
THE DECISION BUT THAT GOY DECIDED TO QTE WAIT AND SEE. UNQTE  
HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ANY ANNOUNCE-  
MENT OF THE DECISION COUCHED IN TERMS OF OUR DESIRE  
TO HELP YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHER NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.  
IT IS OBVIOUS THAT GOY DOES NOT WISH US TO FINGER  
YUGOSLAVIA AS A PARTICULARLY EXPOSED AND DANGEROUS  
PLACE IN THE WORLD. MINIC ALSO INDICATED THAT  
OTHER NON-ALIGNED FRIENDS, (INDIA, HAD  
RAISED QUESTIONS AS TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS  
TRANSACTION, IN PARTICULAR WHETHER GOY WAS REALLY  
SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SOVIETS AND WHETHER TOW PURCHASE  
REFLECTED A TILT TOWARD U.S. IN THEIR NON-ALIGNED POSTURE.  
I RESPONDED THAT IN OUR PUBLIC STATE-  
MENTS AND IN OUR STATEMENTS TO CONGRESS WE WOULD  
KEEP GOY SENSITIVITIES IN MIND BUT I AGAIN REITERATED  
IT WAS NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN WHY SUCH A SALE WAS  
IN THE AMERICAN INTEREST.

4. MINIC CONCLUDED THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION BY  
SAYING THAT THIS DECISION REMOVES A QTE BURDEN UNQTE  
ON OUR RELATIONSSHIP. HE POINTED OUT FOR YEARS  
THEY HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY EVEN GETTING SPARE PARTS  
FOR EQUIPMENT AND THAT THIS DECISION FORESHADOWED  
A NEW ATTITUDE BETWEEN OUR TWO MILITARY ESTABLISH-  
MENTS.

5. I THEN REFERRED TO THE OVER-FLIGHTQUESTION AS  
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A MATTER CONSTITUTING A BURDEN ON OUR RELATIONS  
FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. MINIC SEEMED CONSIDERABLY  
NON-PLUSSED AT OUR UNEQUIVOCAL RESPONSE TO MOJSOV  
DISCUSSION WITH ME. HE WAS CLEARLY AWARE OF OUR  
DISCUSSION AND REITERATED MOJSOV'S STATEMENTS ALMOST  
VERBATIM, EMPHASIZING (A) THERE WAS NO AIRLIFT, (B)  
SOVIETS HAVE NOT REQUESTED CLEARANCE FOR MILITARY  
PLANES AND (C) ONLY A NORMAL NUMBER OF

CIVILIAN PLANES, ACCORDING TO GOY INFORMATION, HAD  
OVERFLOWN YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE PERIOD WE DESCRIBED.  
HE THEN WENT ON TO RUEFULLY CONCEDE THAT WE MUST  
HAVE MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT AND POINTED  
OUT THAT IF THEY HAD ACCESS TO THAT EQUIPMENT THEY  
COULD ENQUIRE FURTHER. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY  
SINCE THEY WERE SUPPORTING MPLA IF THEY  
HAD PERMITTED OVERFLIGHTS THEY WOULD HAVE OPENLY  
ADMITTED IT AS THEY DID DURING THE MIDDLE EAST WAR.

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ACTION NODS-00

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FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5368

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BELGRADE 485

NODIS

PASS ALSO TO WHITE HOUSE FOR SCOWCROFT

HE POINTED OUT THAT OUR UNEQUIVOCAL RESPONSE PUT  
HIM IN A DIFFICULT POSITION SINCE HE HAD ALREADY  
GONE TO THEIR QTE AUTHORITIES UNQTE AND THEY HAD HAD ANOTHER  
IMPRESSION AND HAD NO WAY TO INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY  
OUR CONTENTION. I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD OBVIOUSLY  
NO INTEREST IN GIVING THEM ANYTHING BUT ACCURATE  
INFORMATION AND THEY OUGHT TO BE DAMNED CONCERNED  
IF A FOREIGN POWER WAS CAPABLE OF MILITARY OVER-  
FLIGHTS WITHOUT DETECTION.

6. MINIC LAUNCHED INTO A GENERAL DISCUSSION ON ANGOLA,  
EMPHASIZING THAT (A) THEY HAD BEEN SUPPORTING THE  
MPLA FOR TEN YEARS, (B) ANGOLA WOULD SURELY BE NON-  
ALIGNED, (C) OUR POLICY WAS PUSHING THEM INTO DEPENDENCE  
ON THE SOVIET UNION. HE WENT ON TO CLAIM THE AFRICANS  
BELIEVED THAT WE WERE SUPPORTING THE SOUTH AFRICANS  
WHO ARE A MAJOR MILITARY POWER WHOSE CAPACITY

THREATENS ALL OF BLACK AFRICA. I REITERATED OUR POSITION AGAINST ALL INTERVENTION AND POINTEDLY ASKED MINIC WHETHER HE SUPPORTED THE STATEMENT OPPOSING ALL INTERVENTION BAKARIC HAD MADE TO CODEL MORGAN. MINIC RESPONSE WAS QTE ABSOLUTELY UNQTE. I THEN ASKED WHY THEY DID NOT PUBLICLY EXPRESSED THAT VIEW AND HE LAUNCHED INTO AN ARGUMENT THAT SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD WITHDRAW DIRST AND AFTER THAT NETO WOULD HAVE NO NEED FOR OUTSIDE SECRET

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SUPPORT. I RESPONDED BY TELLING HIM IT WAS THE CHICKEN AND EGG QUESTION AND THAT THE ONLY APPROPRIATE AND RESPONSIBLE POSITION FOR NATIONS CONCERNED ABOUT OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN AFRICA WAS TO PUBLICLY OPPOSE ALL INTERVENTION AND TO URGE ALL OUTSIDE INTERVENORS TO IMMEDIATELY GET OUT OF ANGOLA. IN RESPONSE TO HIS DISCUSSION ABOUT THE "NON-ALIGNED" POSITION, I POINTED OUT THAT NON-ALIGNED NATIONS IN AFRICA HAD SPLIT ON THIS ISSUE. I PARTICULARLY POINTED TO EGYPT'S POSITION. THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY A SORE SPOT WITH MINIC WHO IN IRRITATED TONE EMPHASIZED THAT THEY WERE IN CONTACT WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND THAT TWO COUNTRIES SIMPLY DO NOT AGREE ON THIS QUESTION.

7. WITH RESPECT TO ZAIRE, MINIC SAID THEIR INFORMATION INDICATED THERE WAS DISSATISFACTION INSIDE THAT COUNTRY BECAUSE OF MOBUTU POLICY AND THAT PEOPLE IN ZAIRE AS WELL AS OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES WERE CONCERNED ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA. I RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NOT SOUTH AFRICAN PLANES THAT HAD RECENTLY BOMBED ZAIRE AND IT WAS NOT SOUTH AFRICA AGAINST WHICH ZAIRE HAD THREATENED TO DECLARE WAR.

8. I MADE CLEAR OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE PRESCEDENT OF THE USE OF SOVEIT POWER IN SUPPORT OF A MINORITY GROUP IN ANY COUNTRY AND THE OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES WHO MAY AT SOME TIME BE VULNERABLE TO JUST SUCH AN INTERVENTION. MINIC DUCKED THAT THRUST AND RESPONDED THAT IT LOOKED LIKE THE PROBLEM IN ANGOLA WAS ON THE WAY TO BEING SOLVED. I RESPONDED THAT IT DEPENDED HOW EFFICIENT THE SOVIETS AND THEIR PUPPETS THE CUBANS WERE AT KILLING ANGOLANS. HE RETORTED THAT THAT WAS A BRUTAL WAY OF PUTTING THE MATTER AND I RESPONDED THE SOVIETS WERE PURSUING A BRUTAL POLICY.

9. I GAVE THE SECRETARY A CURSORY EXPLANATION OF MY ILO MISSION AS A COURTESY BUT DECLINED TO BE DRAWN INTO A LENGTHY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION. I TOLD HIM

THAT MY INSTRUCTION WERE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH  
OUR ALLIES INITIALLY BUT THAT I WOULD BE PREPARED AT A  
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SUBSEQUENT TIME TO DISCUSS IT WITH HIM. THE MEETING  
CLOSED WITH MY EXPRESSION APPRECIATION FOR THE  
COURTESY AFFORDED CODEL MORGAN AND MY INDICATION  
THAT THE MEETINGS HAD INDEED GONE QUITE WELL  
WHICH MINIC OBVIOUSLY APPRECIATED.

10. COMMENT: MY PERSONAL AND SUBJECTIVE IMPRESSION  
IS THAT MINIC WAS NOT RPT NOT TELLING THE TRUTH  
CONCERNING SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE  
THEY DID NOT KNOW THE PLANES IN QUESTION WERE  
MILITARY AND WERE DESTINED FOR ANGOLA. BUT BY  
INDICATING THEY DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENTLY SOPHISTICATED  
EQUIPMENT TO DRAW THE CONCLUSIONS WE DO, HE HAS  
CONSTRUCTED A RESPONSE TO OUR NOTE WHICH AVOIDS  
JOINING THE ISSUE. HOWEVER, THE WAY HE HANDLED HIMSELF  
IN THE DISCUSSION, THE EXPRESSION ON HIS FACE, AND THE  
TONE OF HIS VOICE AND THE MANNER IN WHICH HE SWITCHED  
INTO A DISCUSSION ON THE UNDERLYING MERITS OF THE  
ANGOLAN QUESTION LEAD ME TO BELIEVE THAT THEY DID  
IN FACT HAVE UNOFFICIAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE AND  
PURPOSE OF THE OVERFLIGHTS. I DARESAY THAT BY MY  
DEMEANOR AND TONE I INDICATED DUBIETY.  
SILBERMAN

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